People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2 ). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.
What makes a decision good or bad? The most obvious quality of a good or bad decision is its hedonic value: A good decision is one that has desired outcomes, and a bad decision is one that has undesired outcomes. No principle in psychology has been more central to understanding human motivation than the hedonic principle. The hedonic principle has produced many insights into the motivational nature of decision making, from Freud's (1923 Freud's ( / 1961b classic work on the effects of unconscious hedonic impulses to the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on the effects of hedonic representations. More generally, outcome value has been the basis for psychological research for centuries, and it underlies most decision-making models, from animal learning models (e.g., Thorndike, 1935) to personality models (e.g., Atkinson, 1964) .
Outcomes do matter to people. People do approach positive outcomes and avoid negative outcomes. The hedonic principle is an important factor in human motivation. Nonetheless, the hedonic principle's dominance as an explanatory factor has taken attention away from other psychological principles that could underlie what makes a decision bad or good (see Higgins, 1997) . This is not to say that the decision-making process, as a principle separate from outcome, has been ignored by psychologists. Substantial attention has been paid to the costs of the decision-making process itself. For example, if a decision-making process entails emotional costs (Janis & Mann, 1977) and/or cognitive costs in effort or time (Simon, 1955 (Simon, , 1967 , the decision itself might be experienced as bad through a cost-benefit analysis.
More relevant to the topic at hand is the value from the manner in which a decision is made. To cite a well-known cultural maxim, "It is not whether you win or lose but how you play the game." Research has shown that, independent of outcome, the means to achieve an outcome have value in themselves, as in the case of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992) . The concept of proper means is rooted in morality. Value from the manner of goal pursuit, however, extends beyond the notion of proper or moral means. The manner of goal pursuit can also have value from regulatory fit. Individuals can pursue the same goal activity with a different regulatory orientation and in a different manner.
Consider, for example, the goal of being a good physician. For some, the orientation toward being a good physician might be nurturance and accomplishment, whereas for others, the orientation might be safety and responsibility. For some, the manner of being a good physician might be to provide extra support and take calculated risks to advance patients' health, whereas for others, the manner might be to prescribe medication and procedures in a conservative manner and only when they are necessary. The regulatory fit varies between these different orientations toward the goal of being a good physician and these different manners of attaining the goal of being a good physician. Providing extra support and taking risks fits better with a nurturance and accomplishment orientation, whereas prescribing only necessary medication and procedures in a conservative manner fits better with a safety and responsibility orientation. What does the individual experience when there is or is not regulatory fit?
In recent articles, Higgins (2000 Higgins ( , 2002 has proposed that, beyond value from proper or moral means, there is another kind of value that derives from the strategic manner in which a decision is made-value from fit. Whereas value from moral means derives value from means that are socially accepted and agreed on and/or match general moral principles, value from fit derives value from means that suit the decision maker's current regulatory orientation. What if people confuse value from fit with value from moral means? Do they then experience ways of behaving that fit their regulatory orientation as morally right and ways of behaving that represent a fit violation as morally wrong? We consider these questions in terms of regulatory orientations and strategic preferences identified by regulatory focus theory.
Regulatory Focus Orientations and Strategic Preferences
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997 (Higgins , 1998 posits that selfregulation operates differently when serving fundamentally different needs. The theory distinguishes between two major classes of desired goals-those related to accomplishment and growth (nurturance), and those related to safety and protection (security). It further proposes the existence of distinct regulatory systems that are concerned with acquiring either nurturance or security. An individual's self-regulation in relation to his or her hopes and aspirations (ideals) satisfies nurturance needs, and the focus is on promotion. An individual's self-regulation in relation to his or her duties and responsibilities (oughts) satisfies safety needs, and the focus is on prevention. A promotion or a prevention focus can be a chronic predisposition of individuals, or it can be momentarily induced by a situation.
Because individuals in a promotion focus have a sensitivity to the presence and absence of positive outcomes (see Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992) , being eager to pursue all means of advancement (i.e., hits) should be their preferred strategy for self-regulation. Because individuals in a prevention focus have a sensitivity to the absence and presence of negative outcomes (see Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992) , being vigilant or careful to avoid mistakes (i.e., correct rejections) should be their preferred strategy for self-regulation. In support of this proposal, Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes (1994) found that participants primed with promotion focus ideals had better recall for goal pursuit vignettes that exemplified strategic eagerness than for those exemplifying strategic vigilance, whereas the reverse was true for participants primed with prevention focus oughts.
Signal detection theory (see Tanner & Swets, 1954 ) distinguishes between four different responses: hits, misses (errors of omission), false alarms (errors of commission), and correct rejections. From this perspective, promotion focus eagerness involves trying to ensure hits and ensure against errors of omission, whereas prevention focus vigilance involves trying to ensure correct rejections and ensure against errors of commission. Crowe and Higgins (1997; see also Friedman & Forster, 2001 ) tested these predicted strategic preferences in a study on recognition memory for a list of nonsense syllables. Depending on their experimental condition, the participants were told that success on the memory task meant they could work on a liked task (promotion focus framing) or could avoid working on a disliked task (prevention focus framing). The recognition memory task involved presenting the original nonsense syllables along with some distractors. The participants had to indicate whether each presented stimulus appeared in the original list. As predicted, participants who received the promotion framing had an eager or risky bias of saying "yes" (i.e., ensuring hits and ensuring against errors of omission). Participants who received the prevention framing had a vigilant or conservative bias of saying "no" (i.e., ensuring correct rejections and ensuring against errors of commission).
Transfer of Value From Fit to Moral Value
The distinctions between regulatory focus orientations (promotion vs. prevention) and strategic preferences (eagerness vs. vigilance) can be used to examine value from fit and its transfer to other kinds of value. Regulatory fit occurs when an individual uses the strategy that his or her regulatory orientation prefers-strategic eagerness for promotion, and strategic vigilance for prevention. According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Copeland et al., 1989) , one of the meanings of right is preferable or appropriate. In this sense, then, it would feel right for an individual to use the strategy that his or her regulatory orientation prefers. Right also means correct or proper. We propose that regulatory fit produces an experience that what is being done is correct or proper (and fit violation produces an experience that what is being done is wrong or improper). This adds an element to the experience that is more than just a pleasant feeling.
When there is regulatory fit, then, the goal pursuit feels right to an individual, which is an experience of correctness whose source is the individual's use of a strategy of goal pursuit that his or her orientation prefers. The question addressed in our studies is whether this experience can be transferred when one evaluates the moral rightness of what has been (or will be) done. This would entail a type of source confusion, because feeling right from regulatory fit derives its experience of rightness simply from the use of a preferred strategy, whereas feeling right from moral righteousness derives its experience from the use of means that are socially accepted or agreed on or match general moral principles. There is considerable evidence in the psychological literature for other kinds of source confusions. It is well known, for example, that people confuse the sources of episodic experiences (Johnson & Raye, 1981) , the sources of accessibility experiences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) , and the sources of excitation and feeling experiences (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Zillman, 1978) . In addition, there is evidence that value from regulatory fit can transfer to outcome value.
In studies by Higgins, Idson, Frietas, Spiegel, and Molden (in press) , participants first completed a measure of the strength of their promotion focus and prevention focus (see Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) . The participants were then given a choice between a Columbia University coffee mug and a disposable pen. The objects had been selected so that the mug was clearly more desirable, and it was, indeed, chosen by almost everyone. The suggested way of making the choice, however, was either with eagerness means ("Think about what you would gain by choosing the mug and what you would gain by choosing the pen") or with vigilance means ("Think about what you would lose by not choosing the mug and what you would lose by not choosing the pen"). Participants then either were asked to assess the monetary price of the mug or were given the opportunity to buy the mug. The results indicated that for participants with a strong promotion focus, the monetary value of the mug was higher in the eager, gain condition than in the vigilant, nonloss condition, whereas the reverse was true for individuals with a strong prevention focus. There was also evidence that this transfer of value from fit to outcome value was independent of the positivity of the participants' mood, which supports the notion that the experience of regulatory fit is more than just a hedonic feeling.
The present studies examine for the first time whether value from fit can transfer to moral evaluations. It should be noted that the general notion that, for people, what feels right is right and what feels wrong is wrong has a long history in Western thought (e.g., Hume, 1777 Hume, /1975 Smith, 1759 Smith, /1997 ; for a recent review, see Haidt, 2001 ). The purpose of our studies is to examine regulatory fit as one source of what feels right or feels wrong and to investigate the transfer of these value experiences to moral evaluations.
Our studies examine transfer of both feeling right from fit and feeling wrong from fit violation. Different objects of evaluation were studied (the self, another person, a public policy). In addition, different measures of moral evaluation were used, including expressions of guilt, evaluations of rightness, and explicit moral judgments. All of these measures entail more than simply evaluating the hedonic or positive-negative nature of what is done. The first two studies investigate how people's expressed guilt from their past transgressions varies depending on whether the transgression was a sin (i.e., error) of omission or commission. Given that guilt means feeling culpable for a breach or violation of moral or social code (Copeland et al., 1989) , expressed guilt reflects a moral evaluation and not just an unpleasant emotional state.
Regulatory Fit and Sins of Commission and Omission
Over 700 years ago, St. Thomas Aquinas (1912 Aquinas ( -1936 wrote that "just as to act and to will are voluntary, so are not to act and not to will." That is, people are culpable when they do bad as well as when they fail to do good. Until quite recently, scholarship on sins of commission and omission had been primarily philosophical in nature (e.g., Lea, 1895; Goldstick, 1980; Rosenberg, 1970) . However, there has been renewed interest in the psychological difference between doing something wrong and not doing something right (for a review, see Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) . There is evidence in the literature that supports the possibility that the fit between regulatory focus and sins of commission or omission might influence negative affect.
In research on actions or inactions that produced negative outcomes, Seta, McElroy, and Seta (2001) found a pattern of results for feelings of regret that are generally consistent with those being proposed here. In one study, the participants read a vignette describing a businessman who produced a negative outcome either by taking an action of switching stock or by not taking an action of switching stock. In addition, the participants were told that the businessman was a person who either enjoyed taking risks (risk seeker) or avoided taking risks (risk avoider). The study found that when the businessman was presented as a (promotion-focused) risk seeker, the participants judged him to have more regret when he did not take action (an error of omission) than when he did take action (an error of commission), and the reverse was true when he was presented as a (prevention-focused) risk avoider. In another study on self-evaluation, Seta et al. (2001) found that when participants thought about a situation of deciding to go out (action) rather than to stay home (inaction), they felt more regret if they had been in an inactive mood (i.e., tired from a busy day) than if they had been in an active mood. This latter study shows, as proposed by Seta et al. (2001) , that people feel regret when an event (e.g., going out) is inconsistent with their orientation at the time (e.g., taking it easy after a tiring, busy day).
The purpose of the first two studies reported here is to examine guilt self-evaluations for sins of commission and omission as a function of the fit violation between individuals' regulatory focus orientations and their strategic errors. Conceptually, a sin of commission can be translated, using signal detection terminology, as a false alarm (an error of commission) transferred to a moral experience, and a sin of omission can be seen as a miss (an error of omission) transferred to a moral experience. We know from Crowe and Higgins (1997) that people in a promotion focus are inclined toward strategic eagerness (a risky bias). They are willing to risk making a greater number of errors of commission to ensure against making errors of omission. Promotion focus individuals, then, do not want errors of omission-errors of omission should feel more wrong than errors of commission. Crowe and Higgins (1997) also found that people in a prevention focus are inclined toward strategic vigilance (a conservative bias). They are willing to risk making a greater number of errors of omission to ensure against making errors of commission. Prevention focus individuals, then, do not want errors of commission-errors of commission should feel more wrong than errors of omission. Studies 1 and 2 examine whether feeling wrong from regulatory fit violation produces negative value transfer to moral value when one considers past transgressions. Specifically, people in a promotion focus should experience more guilt when recalling errors (sins) of omission than errors (sins) of commission, whereas the reverse should be true for people in a prevention focus-in other words, what feels wrong is wrong.
A unique feature of the first two studies is that participants recalled times in their life when they actually committed different kinds of transgressions: sins of commission, and sins of omission. Both chronic measures of promotion and prevention focus (Study 1) and situational priming of promotion and prevention (Study 2) were used to provide convergent evidence. The remaining two studies, to be described more fully later, examine transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit to evaluations of the rightness of a conflict resolution imposed by an authority figure (Study 3) and to the perceived morality of a public policy (Study 4)-in other words, they examine whether what feels right is right.
Study 1: Chronic Measures of Promotion and Prevention Pride Predicting Guilt for Sins of Omission and Commission
In Study 1, participants filled out a questionnaire that measures, separately, both chronic promotion orientation and chronic prevention orientation. They were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which they were asked to recall a past moral transgression (error) of either omission or commission, and these transgressions were framed as failures of either promotion or prevention concerns. Participants were then asked how guilty the transgression made them feel. It should be noted that expressions of guilt are more than just hedonic judgments. They are selfevaluations of having failed to be righteous.
The major prediction was that a transgression or error within a person's dominant regulatory orientation (i.e., a fit violation) would produce more guilt. Thus, individuals with a dominant promotion orientation would feel more guilt from an error of omission than from an error of commission, whereas the reverse would be true for individuals with a dominant prevention orientation. A secondary prediction was that individuals with a predominant promotion orientation would feel more guilt from a failure relevant to promotion concerns (e.g., supporting others) than from a failure relevant to prevention concerns (e.g., social responsibility), whereas the reverse would be true for individuals with a predominant prevention orientation.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-two Columbia University students (79 male, 53 female) were paid for their participation. (Gender had no significant effects.) All participants indicated that English was their native language.
Procedure. Participants first completed the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; see Higgins et al., 2001 ) as part of a larger battery of measures. According to McClelland and Atkinson's (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Clark, 1982; McClelland, 1961; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) classic theory of achievement motivation, achievement tasks elicit a feeling of pride for individuals with a subjective history of success. The RFQ distinguishes between two different kinds of achievement pridepromotion pride and prevention pride. It asks participants questions related to their subjective history of success with promotion (promotion pride) and prevention (prevention pride).
Previous research (e.g., Higgins et al., 2001) has shown that individuals with higher promotion pride are more eager to ensure hits and ensure against errors of omission. Thus, as promotion pride increases, errors (i.e., sins) of omission should feel especially wrong. Previous research (e.g., Higgins et al., 2001 ) has also shown that individuals with higher prevention pride are more vigilant to ensure correct rejections and ensure against errors of commission. Thus, as prevention pride increases, errors (i.e., sins) of commission should feel especially wrong.
The RFQ asks 11 questions in total, of which the promotion subset (6 questions) measures individuals' subjective history of promotion success with items such as "How often have you accomplished things that got you 'psyched' to work even harder?" The prevention subset (5 questions) measures subjective history of prevention success with questions such as "Not being careful has gotten me into trouble at times" (reverse scored). The response scales for these questions range from 1 (never or seldom) to 5 (very often). Higher scores on the individual subsets indicate greater promotion pride and prevention pride and are associated with a strategic inclination to pursue goals in an eager or vigilant manner, respectively (see Higgins et al., 2001) .
After completing the battery of questionnaires, participants randomly received one of four different versions of the Pressures of Life Questionnaire (PLQ). The PLQ essentially asked participants to think back to a time in their life when they transgressed by an error of commission or an error of omission. In addition, each type of transgression was described as either a failure of promotion concerns (social support) or a failure of prevention concerns (social responsibility). This second manipulation allowed us to examine for the first time whether individuals feel greater guilt when their failure is relevant to the concerns of their predominant regulatory focus rather than the concerns of the alternative focus. More important, it permitted a test of whether negative transfer from fit violation to feelings of moral guilt is independent of the relevance of the transgression to promotion or prevention concerns. In all, there were four different versions of the PLQ, varying by error of commission versus error of omission and by failure of promotion concerns versus failure of prevention concerns. Participants were randomly assigned into one of the four experimental conditions with the following instructions. In the error of commission/ failure of promotion support condition, participants were told, We ask that you think back to a time when you acted indifferently to a significant other or behaved in a way to make a friend feel inconsequential and unimportant, or you did some other type of behavior that you feel was the "wrong thing to do."
In the error of commission/failure of prevention responsibility condition, participants were told, We ask that you think back to a time in when you lied to your significant other or took advantage of or cheated a friend or you did some other type of behavior that you feel was the "wrong thing to do."
In the error of omission/failure of promotion support condition, participants were told, We ask that you think back to a time when you did not offer help to a significant other, or did not act caring or attentive to a friend, or you did not do some other type of behavior that you feel was the "right thing to do."
In the error of omission/failure of prevention responsibility condition, participants were told, We ask that you think back to a time when you did not tell the whole truth to a significant other or did not act in a trusting or faithful manner to a friend or you did not do some other type of behavior that you feel was the "right thing to do."
Participants were then asked to briefly write down what they did or did not do. After they finished writing, they were asked a question about how guilty their behavior made them feel on a 9-point scale varying from 0 (not at all guilty) to 8 (very guilty). Participants were then paid and fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion
To test our predictions, we simultaneously regressed felt guilt on RFQ promotion, RFQ prevention, type of error (Ϫ1 for commission; 1 for omission), type of transgression concern (Ϫ1 for failure of prevention concerns; 1 for failure of promotion concerns), the interaction of type of error with RFQ promotion, the interaction of type of error with RFQ prevention, the interaction of type of transgression concern with RFQ promotion, and the interaction of type of transgression concern with RFQ prevention.
The analysis revealed only four significant interactions for guilt feelings. Specifically, there was a significant positive interaction for type of error and RFQ promotion (␤ ϭ .61, p ϭ .05), indicating that the stronger a participant's promotion pride was, the more guilty he or she felt from a sin (error) of omission than from a sin of commission. In contrast, there was a significant negative interaction for type of error and RFQ prevention (␤ ϭ Ϫ.68, p Ͻ .05), indicating that the stronger a participant's prevention pride was, the more guilty he or she felt from a sin of commission than from a sin of omission. Both of these effects of type of sin (error) were in the predicted direction.
The effects on guilt feelings of type of regulatory focus concerns were also in the predicted direction. There was a significant positive interaction for type of transgression concern and RFQ promotion (␤ ϭ .74, p Ͻ .05), indicating that the stronger a participant's promotion pride was, the more guilty he or she felt from a failure of promotion concerns (supporting others) than from a failure of prevention concerns (social responsibility). There was also a significant interaction for type of transgression concern and RFQ prevention (␤ ϭ Ϫ.76, p Ͻ .05), indicating that the stronger a participant's prevention pride was, the more guilty he or she felt from a failure of prevention concerns than from a failure of promotion concerns.
To illustrate these significant interactions, we created an RFQ index by subtracting participants' prevention pride scores from their promotion pride scores. We then performed a tertiary split on this index, creating a predominant promotion pride group and a predominant prevention pride group. As shown in Figure 1 , participants with predominant promotion pride felt more guilt from a sin (error) of omission than from a sin of commission, whereas the reverse was true for participants with predominant prevention pride. As shown in Figure 2 , participants with predominant promotion pride felt more guilt from a failure of promotion concerns (supporting others) than from a failure of prevention concerns (social responsibility), whereas the reverse was true for participants with predominant prevention pride.
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that there can be transfer of negative value from fit violation to moral value that is experienced as guilt. People with strong promotion pride want strategic eagerness, and errors of omission violate this strategy. Such errors "feel wrong"-transferred to morality, this indicates that if something feels wrong, it is wrong. Errors of omission become sins of omission, and guilt is felt. Similarly, people with strong prevention pride want strategic vigilance, and errors of commission violate this strategy. Again, such errors "feel wrong." Errors of commission become sins of commission, and guilt is felt.
Study 1 also allows us to examine for the first time whether individuals feel greater guilt when their transgression is specifically relevant to the concerns of their predominant focus. The study has found that people with strong promotion pride feel more guilt about a failure of promotion concerns than about a failure of prevention concerns, and people with strong prevention pride feel more guilt about a failure of prevention concerns than about a failure of promotion concerns. It is important to note that the negative transfer from fit violation to moral guilt described above was independent of this effect of transgression relevance to predominant concerns, and vice versa.
The effect on guilt feelings of failing to meet a personally relevant concern could be understood in terms of the classic viewpoint on morality and guilt. For strong promotion individuals, their concern with supporting others is an important standard or principle, and, thus, failing such concerns is failing to behave properly. Such a failure is wrong and should produce guilt feelings. Similarly, for strong prevention individuals, failing their social responsibilities is failing to behave properly. It is wrong and should produce guilt feelings.
From this classic viewpoint on morality and guilt, the effect on guilt feelings of fit violation from errors of omission versus commission is surprising. These errors were independent of content; sometimes they involved promotion concerns, and sometimes they involved prevention concerns. The results of Study 1 demonstrate that, independent of the specific content of the concerns or standards, a fit violation between a type of strategic error (omission or commission) and the strong focus of a person (promotion or prevention) increased guilt feelings. Independent of the relevance to personal concerns, a fit violation felt wrong, and this negative value transferred to the transgression itself to increase guilt feelings about it-indicating that if something feels wrong, it is wrong. Study 1, then, shows that one can increase guilt feelings both by doing something that is wrong in the classic sense of failing a personally relevant standard or principle and by doing something that simply feels wrong because of regulatory fit violation.
Study 1 demonstrates that fit violation with chronic orientations of promotion or prevention pride can increase guilt feelings. The value from fit model (Higgins, 2000) describes fit in terms of people's regulatory states. It is not necessary for these states to be chronic. For example, in their Study 5, Higgins et al. (2001) used an experimental priming technique to make participants temporarily experience either a subjective history of promotion success or a subjective history of prevention success. They found that a momentary state of promotion pride increased eager motivation and that a momentary state of prevention pride increased vigilant motivation. Such momentary states of promotion pride or prevention pride should also show the effects of fit and fit violation.
Using the Higgins et al. (2001) priming manipulation, Study 2 experimentally induces states of promotion pride or prevention pride and tests whether fit violation also increases guilt feelings for such momentary states. In addition to providing converging evidence for our predictions, the experimental nature of Study 2 controls for any possibility of socialization differences contributing to the predicted pattern of results. Study 2 also checks and controls for the possibility that there could be differences in the seriousness of the different sins that participants remembered, which could contribute to the magnitude of guilt feelings reported.
Study 2: Experimentally Induced Promotion and Prevention Pride Predicting Guilt for Sins of Omission and Commission
In contrast to Study 1, which used chronic measures of regulatory focus pride, Study 2 induced promotion pride or prevention pride through an experimental priming manipulation (see Higgins et al., 2001, Study 5) . Study 2 also used a within-subject design by giving each participant questions regarding both an error of commission and an error of omission. The dependent measure was felt guilt.
Consistent with the predictions and results of Study 1, participants induced to experience promotion pride should be more eager to ensure hits and ensure against errors of omission, which would make errors (i.e., sins) of omission feel especially wrong. In contrast, promotion nonpride does not produce eagerness, and thus participants induced to experience promotion nonpride should not feel especially guilty about errors of omission. In addition, participants induced to experience prevention pride should be more vigilant to ensure correct rejections and ensure against errors of commission, which would make errors (i.e., sins) of commission feel especially wrong. In contrast, prevention nonpride does not produce vigilance, and thus participants induced to experience prevention nonpride should not feel especially guilty about errors of commission.
Method
Participants. Ninety-three Columbia University students (49 male, 44 female) were paid for their participation. (Gender had no significant effects.) All participants indicated that English was their native language.
Procedure. Participants first completed a regulatory focus priming exercise. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four different priming conditions: promotion pride, promotion nonpride, prevention pride, and prevention nonpride. The priming consisted of participants answering three different prompts. These questions were variations on items taken directly from the RFQ and were as follows (for another study using this priming technique, see Higgins et al., 2001, Study 5) .
For the promotion focus/pride condition, we asked participants the following questions: "Please tell us about a time in your past when you felt like you made progress toward being successful in life," "Please tell us about a time in your past, when compared to most people, you were able to get what you wanted out of life," and "Please tell us about a time in your past, when trying to achieve something important to you, you performed as well as you ideally would have liked to."
For the promotion focus/nonpride condition, we asked participants the following questions: "Please tell us about a time in your past when you felt like you failed to make progress toward being successful in life," "Please tell us about a time in your past, when compared to most people, you were unable to get what you wanted out of life," and "Please tell us about a time in your past, when trying to achieve something important to you, you failed to perform as well as you ideally would have liked to."
For the prevention focus/pride condition, we asked participants the following questions: "Please tell us about a time in your past when being careful enough has avoided getting you into trouble," "Please tell us about a time in your past, when growing up, you stopped yourself from acting in a way that your parents would have considered objectionable," and "Please tell us about a time in your past when you were careful not to get on your parents' nerves."
For the prevention focus/nonpride condition, we asked participants the following questions: "Please tell us about a time in your past when not being careful enough has gotten you into trouble," "Please tell us about a time in your past, when growing up, you acted in a way that your parents Figure 2 . Amount of guilt felt as a function of predominant regulatory focus pride and content of transgression. considered objectionable," and "Please tell us about a time in your past when you got on your parents' nerves."
Participants were then given a questionnaire that asked them to write about both a past error of omission (e.g., "did not do some type of behavior that you felt was the right thing to do") and a past error of commission (e.g., "did some type of behavior that you consider was the wrong thing to do"). The order of the errors varied randomly across participants, and there were no order effects. As in Study 1, the dependent measure was how much guilt the participants felt about their past behaviors, answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all guilty) to 8 (very guilty). For each type of past behavior, the participants also expressed their belief about the seriousness of the behavior on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all serious) to 8 (extremely serious). Seriousness of transgression was included as a covariate in the analysis to control for any possible effect it might have on intensity of guilt feelings. Participants were then paid and fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the data for felt guilt using a repeated measures analysis of variance with regulatory focus (promotion, prevention) and pride (pride, nonpride) as the between-subjects variables and type of error (commission, omission) as the within-subject variable. Seriousness of transgression ratings were included as a covariate in the analysis. In addition to controlling statistically for seriousness, we also checked whether the seriousness of sins (errors) of commission versus omission varied in the different priming conditions. There were no significant differences among any of the conditions. Indeed, the mean ratings of seriousness for the critical pride conditions were almost identical (promotion pride, sin of omission, M ϭ 4.9, sin of commission, M ϭ 4.8; prevention pride, sin of omission, M ϭ 4.7, sin of commission, M ϭ 4.8).
The analysis for guilt feelings revealed only a three-way interaction, F(1, 89) ϭ 3.86, p ϭ .05. A planned contrast analysis revealed that the difference in felt guilt for sins (errors) of omission versus sins of commission between promotion and prevention was significant in the pride condition ( p Ͻ .05) but was not significant in the nonpride condition ( p Ͼ .50). As predicted and shown in Figure 3 , participants with promotion pride felt more guilt from sins of omission than from sins of commission, whereas the reverse was true for participants with prevention pride.
Study 2, then, replicates in an experimental study the effect of fit violation on guilt that was found in Study 1. Specifically, participants with situationally primed pride in promotion felt more guilt about an error of omission than about an error of commission, whereas the reverse was true for participants with situationally primed pride in prevention. This pattern of experimental findings supports the conclusion from Study 1 that the eagerness of promotion pride makes errors of omission feel wrong and the vigilance of prevention pride makes errors of commission feel wrong. What feels wrong transfers to what is wrong and produces greater guilt. Study 2 also shows that these effects are independent of the seriousness of the past behaviors remembered.
As expected, there was no effect of fit violation in the nonpride conditions. Promotion pride orients a person toward strategic eagerness, and prevention pride orients a person toward strategic vigilance. In contrast, promotion nonpride and prevention nonpride do not orient a person toward eagerness or vigilance, respectively. Because there are no strong strategic inclinations associated with promotion or prevention nonpride (see Higgins et al., 2001 ), we did not expect to find regulatory fit effects in these conditions.
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate transfer of negative value from fit violation to moral self-evaluation, as reflected in felt guilt for sins (errors) of either omission or commission. A question left unanswered from these studies is whether regulatory fit also influences moral evaluation of another person's actions. Study 3 addresses this issue by examining positive transfer of value from fit to judgments of the moral rightness of the conflict resolutions performed by authority figures in the past of the participants.
Another purpose of Study 3 is to address the issue of whether the effect of regulatory fit on moral evaluation is just some effect Figure 3 . Adjusted means (for seriousness) for amount of guilt felt as a function of primed high regulatory focus pride (between subjects) and type of sin (within subject). of positive or negative mood that is produced by the experience of fit or nonfit, respectively. As discussed earlier, regulatory fit theory (Higgins, 2000) does not conceptualize feeling right or feeling wrong from regulatory fit or nonfit as simply feeling pleasure or feeling pain. There is also a sense of appropriateness and correctness associated with the experience that is independent of just positive or negative mood (see also Higgins et al., in press ). Study 3 includes standard measures of positive and negative mood to test whether the predicted effects of regulatory fit are, indeed, independent of hedonic mood per se.
Study 3: Promotion and Prevention Pride Predicting Rightness of an Eager or Vigilant Conflict Resolution
There is little doubt that the favorability of the outcome of a conflict resolution for a person influences that person's evaluation of the resolution. However, research has discovered that people are also concerned with the fairness of the outcome. For example, research on relative deprivation has shown that individuals compare what they expected to receive with what they actually received (Crosby, 1976) . Moreover, Thibault and Walker (1975) demonstrated that different manners of dispute resolution engender different judgments of fairness.
More recently, Tyler and Lind (1992) have proposed a groupvalue model of procedural justice that posits that relational concerns underlie procedural justice effects (see also Lind & Tyler, 1988) . That is, the manner in which a person is treated has value for that person. People seek information regarding their status and standing within their social group, and these factors are important determinants of an individual's self-identity, self-respect, and selfesteem. People evaluate three aspects of the procedure to determine whether it is fair and thus whether they can feel pride and respect: trust, neutrality, and status recognition.
We propose that yet another important aspect of procedural justice is regulatory fit. If the manner of conflict resolution fits with an individual's regulatory orientation, value from fit transfers to moral value-in other words, if it feels right, it is right. Participants in Study 3 completed the RFQ and were later asked to recall a conflict resolution in their past in which an authority figure determined the manner of resolution. The manner of conflict resolution was described in terms of either eagerness that fits with promotion or vigilance that fits with prevention. In addition, the manner of the resolution was described as being either positive or negative for the participant. Participants were asked several questions regarding the procedural justice of the resolution (modeled after the group-value model). Participants were then asked how right was the resolution. We predicted that individuals who were high in promotion pride would perceive a conflict resolution (determined by an authority figure) as more right when the manner of the resolution was eager compared with vigilant and that the reverse would be true for participants who were high in prevention pride. Moreover, we predicted that these results would be independent of procedural justice concerns and the valence of the resolution for the participant. A general mood measure was also obtained. We predicted that the positive transfer effect of value from fit to perceived rightness would be independent of participants' mood.
Method
Participants. Seventy-three Columbia University students (32 male, 41 female) were paid for their participation. (Gender had no significant effects.) The data from 6 of these participants were excluded from the analysis because these participants did not follow the instructions properly and provided incomplete data. All participants indicated that English was their native language.
Procedure. Participants completed the RFQ as part of a battery of questionnaires. On completion of the battery, participants received one of eight different versions of the Conflict Resolution Questionnaire (CRQ). The CRQ asked participants to think back to a time in their life when they had a conflict with an authority figure (either a parent or an authority figure other than their parent) and that authority figure determined the manner of conflict resolution. Participants were asked to think back to a resolution resolved through eager or vigilant means. Additionally, the manner of the resolution was described in terms of being positive or negative for the participant. In all, there were eight different versions of the CRQ (parent vs. other authority; eager vs. vigilant manner; positive vs. negative resolution). Below are four of the versions used; all are framed in terms of parent resolution (the remaining four were identical to these four except that they featured an authority figure other than a parent).
For the eager resolution means/positive valence condition, we told participants,
We ask that you think back to a time when you had a conflict with your parent or guardian and he/she resolved the conflict by encouraging desired behaviors (e.g., encouraging you to succeed, setting up opportunities for you to engage in rewarding activities, etc.).
For the eager resolution means/negative valence condition, we told participants, We ask that you think back to a time when you had a conflict with your parent or guardian and he/she resolved the conflict by withdrawing his/her support (e.g., taking away a privilege, acting disappointed when you fail, etc.).
For the vigilant resolution means/positive valence condition, we told participants, We ask that you think back to a time when you had a conflict with your parent or guardian and he/she resolved the conflict by safeguarding against undesired behaviors (e.g., removing anything that might cause trouble, making you alert to potential dangers, etc.).
For the vigilant resolution means/negative valence condition, we told participants, We ask that you think back to a time when you had a conflict with your parent or guardian and he/she resolved the conflict by curtailing your undesired behaviors (e.g., raising his/her voice at you when you did not perform well, criticizing you for making a mistake, etc.).
After these instructions, the CRQ asked participants to write down briefly how the conflict was resolved. The participants were then asked to respond to several questions, with the scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 8 (extremely). There were 10 questions that were adapted from the relational index used by Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996;  see the Appendix for the complete relational index used). We computed responses to the relational index to calculate a single relational concern index. Participants were also asked how good, sad (reverse coded), and angry (reverse coded) the resolution made them feel. We also computed these questions to create a positive mood index and included them to control for any effects of mood on the judgments of the resolutions. Finally, participants were asked, "How right was the resolution in the long run?"
To test our predictions, we regressed judgments of rightness on promotion pride, prevention pride, strategic manner of the conflict resolution (Ϫ1 for vigilance; 1 for eagerness), valence of the conflict resolution (1 for positive; 2 for negative), the interaction term for strategic manner with promotion pride, and the interaction term for strategic manner with prevention pride. It is important to note that there were no significant differences in the results as a function of whether the authority figure was a parent. Thus, this variable was collapsed in all of the analyses reported here. It is also notable that the valence had no significant effects.
The analysis revealed a main effect and two significant interactions. There was a significant main effect for prevention pride (␤ ϭ .23, p Ͻ .01), indicating that the stronger the participants' prevention pride was, the more right they judged the resolution to be (independent of strategic manner or valence). Because the manner of resolution was always determined by an authority figure in this study and because prevention is more concerned with authority than is promotion (see Rohan & Zanna, 1998) , it is possible that the manner of resolution in this study was generally more relevant to prevention than to promotion. This could have produced the main effect and should be studied further.
As predicted, there were also two significant interactions (see Figure 4) . First, there was a significant interaction of strategic manner and promotion pride (␤ ϭ .15, p Ͻ .05), indicating that the stronger a participant's promotion pride was, the more right he or she judged the eager resolution to be compared with the vigilant resolution. Second, a significant interaction of strategic manner and prevention pride revealed that the stronger a participant's prevention pride was, the more right he or she judged the vigilant resolution to be compared with the eager resolution (␤ ϭ Ϫ.15, p Ͻ .05). These results support our main prediction. Participants judged a conflict resolution as more right when the manner of the resolution fit their regulatory focus orientation. The results also show that this fit effect was independent of the valence of the conflict resolution. Regardless of whether the resolution was resolved in a manner that was pleasurable or painful at the time that it happened, regulatory fit increased evaluations that the resolution was right. 1 To test for the effect of positive mood on judgments of rightness, we again performed the regression analysis, with mood included as a variable. The analysis revealed that more positive mood related to higher judgments of rightness (␤ ϭ .21, p Ͻ .01). It is notable that there was no significant relation between regulatory fit (Promotion Pride ϫ Strategy; Prevention Pride ϫ Strategy) and positive mood (both ps Ͼ .2). Most important for the purpose of this article, a subsequent analysis also revealed that the value from fit effects basically remained when positive mood was included in the analysis. Higher promotion pride resulted in higher judgments of rightness for an eager resolution compared with a vigilant resolution (␤ ϭ .16, p Ͻ .05), and higher prevention pride resulted in higher judgments of rightness for a vigilant resolution compared with an eager resolution (␤ ϭ Ϫ.11, p ϭ .087). Thus, 1 We also tested the effects of relational concerns on judgments of rightness. Supporting the prediction of Tyler and Lind's (1992) groupvalue model of procedural justice, the analysis revealed a significant effect for relational concerns on judgments of rightness (␤ ϭ. 13, p Ͻ .05), such that when participants felt that the resolution's procedures were trustworthy, were neutral, and acknowledged status recognition, they judged the resolution to be more right. A separate analysis revealed that there was no significant relation between regulatory fit (Promotion Pride ϫ Strategy; Prevention Pride ϫ Strategy) and the relational index (both ps Ͼ .2). Most important for the purpose of this article, the value from fit effects remained when relational concerns were included in the analysis. Specifically, participants who were high in promotion pride judged the resolution as more right when it was an eager resolution than when it was a vigilant resolution (␤ ϭ .13, p ϭ .05), and participants who were high in prevention pride judged the resolution as more right when it was a vigilant resolution than when it was an eager resolution (␤ ϭ Ϫ.11, p ϭ .07). Thus, both relational concerns (i.e., feelings of being treated fairly) and value from fit (i.e., feeling right from regulatory fit) independently increased judgments of rightness. both positive mood and value from fit independently increased judgments of rightness.
In sum, Study 3 finds that regulatory fit has significant effects on judgments of rightness in conflict resolutions, independently of relational concerns and mood. The manner of conflict resolution was always determined by the authority figure rather than by the participant. Thus, the positive transfer of value from fit to moral judgment-that is, the idea that when something feels right, it is right-can occur for judgments of another person's actions. In Study 4, we examine whether value from fit can also produce transfer of positive value to the perceived morality of a public policy rather than a person. Study 4 also addresses the issue of whether regulatory fit transfer is restricted to cases in which the object of evaluation has a clear moral character, as in Studies 1-3. In Study 4, the object of evaluation was a public policy proposal for an after-school program that had no clear moral character, as did the topic content of Studies 1-3.
Study 4: Promotion and Prevention Pride Predicting Morality of an Eager or Vigilant Public Policy Proposal
Participants first filled out the RFQ measure of promotion pride and prevention pride and were then asked to read a proposal about a citywide policy change involving the New York public school system. Pursuit of the program was framed to emphasize either eagerness or vigilance. Participants were then asked to judge the moral rightness of the program. 
Method
Participants. Eighty-seven Columbia University students were paid for their participation. All participants indicated that English was their native language. Gender data were not available for this study.
Procedure. Participants first filled out the RFQ measure of promotion pride and prevention pride, as in Study 1. Shortly after, each participant read an essay (approximately 750 words) advocating a new proposed citywide policy change involving the New York public school system and the city of New York: "A new city tax would be applied toward the development and implementation of a special after-school program for public grade-and high-school level students." Participants received one of two different versions of the essay. The eager framing emphasized pursuing the program in an eager manner-for example, "The primary reason for supporting this program is because it will advance children's education and support more children to succeed." The vigilant framing emphasized pursuing the program in a vigilant manner-for example, "The primary reason for supporting this program is because it will secure children's education and prevent more children from failing." Nonetheless, the actual structure, content, and primary goal of the program were identical for both versions. In addition, the sentences describing the details of the program were identical in both conditions-for example, "Another noteworthy aspect of this program will be its comprehensive content, which will include both academic and non-academic domains." After reading about the program, the participants were asked to rate it on a 7-point scale: "To what extent is the primary goal of the after-school program right from a moral point of view," ranging from 0 (not at all right) to 6 (very right). Participants then completed a battery of questions unrelated to the present topic, were paid, and were fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion
The degree to which individuals felt that the program was morally right was regressed on RFQ promotion, RFQ prevention, the framing of the proposal (1 for eagerness; Ϫ1 for vigilance), the Framing ϫ RFQ Promotion interaction, and the Framing ϫ RFQ Prevention interaction (see Figure 5) . The analysis revealed, as predicted, only two significant interactions. There was a significant interaction for Framing ϫ RFQ Promotion (␤ ϭ .77, p Ͻ .05) and a significant interaction in the opposite direction for Framing ϫ RFQ Prevention (␤ ϭ Ϫ.72, p ϭ .06). These interactions 2 Study 4 was included within a larger study that was concerned with persuasion rather than moral judgments (see Cesario, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 2002) . The results reported here have not been and will not be reported elsewhere. revealed that individuals with strong promotion pride judged the eager program as more morally right than the vigilant program, whereas individuals with strong prevention pride judged the vigilant program as more morally right than the eager program.
General Discussion
According to the value from fit model (Higgins, 2000) , people experience regulatory fit when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Our studies test whether these experiences of correctness can be transferred to subsequent moral evaluations.
Studies 1 and 2 found that there can be transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation to expressed guilt for one's past transgressions. Both when participants' promotion or prevention orientation was chronic (Study 1) and when it was experimentally induced (Study 2), participants expressed more guilt when the manner of their transgression was a fit violation with their orientation (e.g., a sin of omission for promotion, a sin of commission for prevention). Study 2 demonstrates that this effect was independent of the subjective seriousness of the past transgressions.
Studies 3 and 4 found that there can also be transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit to subsequent evaluations of rightness. Participants evaluated a conflict resolution and a public policy as being more right when the described manner of pursuing the resolution or policy goal fit their regulatory orientation (an eager manner for promotion, a vigilant manner for prevention). Study 3 shows that, regardless of whether the resolution was resolved in a manner that was pleasurable or painful at the time it happened, regulatory fit increased evaluations of the resolution being right. Study 3 also demonstrates that the fit effect was independent of just the positivity of the participants' mood. This supports our proposal that feeling right from regulatory fit involves a sense of correctness that is more than just a positive feeling. Study 4 demonstrates that regulatory fit can influence a direct and explicit moral evaluation of an object even when the object itself (i.e., a new after-school program) is not intrinsically a matter of morality.
The results of our first two studies have implications for previous research on errors of commission and omission. Seta et al. (2001) suggested that regulatory focus differences could underlie their findings about people's feelings of regret from actions (commissions) and inactions (omissions). Studies 1 and 2 directly examine the effect of regulatory focus fit on expressed guilt from sins of commission and omission. By obtaining results that complement those of Seta et al. (2001) , these studies provide support for their analysis and extend it to the case of moral evaluations.
The regulatory fit perspective is also useful for considerations of why people have different evaluative judgments of past errors depending on when the errors occurred in the past. In a review of the literature on regret for past errors, Gilovich and Medvec (1995) found a temporal pattern to the experience of regret for errors of commission and errors of omission. They found that actions generate more regret in the short term but that inactions cause more regret in the long term. It may be that a temporal aspect of regulatory fit is contributing to these results.
In a recent research program, Camacho and Higgins (2002a) have found evidence that when people are asked to recall past goals, they tend to recall promotion ideals for the distal past and prevention oughts for the proximal past. That is, promotion is construed in the more distant past than is prevention. Camacho and Higgins (2002b) argued that there are motivational underpinnings for this temporal construal effect. From a promotion standpoint, one way to assess self-regulation is to refer to an earlier state-if the individual is better off now than he or she was before, then progress has been achieved. However, prevention self-regulation does not function the same way. In a prevention state, it does not matter that one was responsible in the past if one is presently careless-minimal goals must be met in the present for effective prevention self-regulation. Therefore, there may be a temporal component to regulatory focus that lends promotion to be construed in the distal past and that lends prevention to be construed in the proximal past. Thus, if promotion engenders a distal temporal construal and finds errors of omission particularly aversive and if prevention engenders a proximal temporal construal and finds errors of commission especially aversive, then regulatory focus could contribute to the observed findings regarding the temporal experience of regret (cf. Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) . It is noteworthy that Seta et al. (2001) made very similar predictions when applying the logic of regulatory focus theory and their consistency model to the issue of regret for past errors.
Taking a regulatory fit perspective might also be useful when one is considering the difference between goal attainment and goal maintenance. We know that promotion is concerned with gaining additions and prevention is concerned with preventing subtractions (Roese, Hur, and Pennington, 1999) . Such strategic inclinations predict that an individual with a predominant promotion focus would be more motivated to attain a goal (gaining an addition), whereas a predominant prevention person would be more motivated to maintain a goal (preventing a subtraction). Recent research supports these predictions (Camacho & Higgins, 2002a) . There is also recent evidence that the monetary value of a prize is higher when predominant promotion persons represent the prize as an attainment and predominant prevention persons represent the same prize as a maintenance (Brodscholl, Kober, & Higgins, 2002) .
It is important to determine not just what people value but how they come to value it. If one takes the concept of value from fit seriously, then one must also take seriously the interactive nature of person and situation-how value is created by the relation between a person's current regulatory orientation and the manner of goal pursuit a situation induces. This new interactive variable of regulatory fit provides insight into the decision-making process that is not available in previous models of value. Value need not be about just hedonic outcomes but is also about the regulatory fit relation between person and situation. Value need not rest solely on culturally accepted standards and customs but must rest also on how a person experiences the manner of goal pursuit in relation to his or her current regulatory orientation. What our findings highlight in particular is that even moral evaluations are influenced by regulatory fit. Regulatory fit affects what feels right or wrong, and this transfers to what people experience as being right or wrong.
